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STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
ORANGE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORS ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
-and-
CASE NO. C-6283
COUNTY OF ORANGE,
Employer,
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
Incumbent.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations 
Board, and it appearing that a negotiating representative has been selected,
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS CERTIFIED that the Orange County District Attorney’s Criminal 
Investigators Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the
Certification - C-6283 page 2
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances.
Included: Chief Criminal Investigator, Senior Criminal Investigator, Career
Criminal Unit Coordinator and Criminal Investigator.
Excluded: All other County employees.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the Orange County District Attorney’s Criminal Investigators
Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: June 5, 2015
Albany, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION,
Petitioner,
-and-
COUNTY OF GREENE,
Employer,
-and-
NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION,
Intervenor.
CASE NO. C-6293
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected;
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act;
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of
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grievances.
Included: Full and part-time per diem registered professional nurse, nurse
practitioner and public health nurse.
Excluded: All other County employees.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: June 5, 2015
Albany, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
WHITEHALL ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. C-6294
WHITEHALL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Employer.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected;
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act;
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Whitehall Administrators Association has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of
grievances.
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Included: Jr/Sr High School Principal, Elementary Principal and CSE
Chairperson.
Excluded: All other employees.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the Whitehall Administrators Association. The duty to
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: June 5, 2015
Albany, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION,
Petitioner,
-and-
FAYETTEVILLE-MANLIUS CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT,
Employer,
-and-
SEIU LOCAL 200UNITED,
Incumbent.
CASE NO. C-6301
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected;
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act;
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances.
Included: School Bus Driver, Substitute School Bus Driver, Bus Attendant,
Substitute Bus Attendant, School Bus Dispatcher, Laborer and 
Driver-Laborer.
Excluded: All other employees.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: June 5, 2015
Albany, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION,
Petitioner,
-and-
BROCKPORT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,
-and-
SEIU LOCAL 200UNITED,
Employer,
Intervenor.
CASE NO. C-6302
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected;
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act;
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of
Certification - C-6302 - 2 -
grievances.
Included: All non-teaching employees.
Excluded: (a) exempt supervisors as identified in the terms and conditions of
employment for exempt supervisors; (b) exempt non-supervisors as 
identified in the terms and conditions of employment for exempt 
non-supervisors; (c) administrative staff members, including all BAA 
members and Central Office administrators; (d) all substitutes; (e) 
all temporary non-teaching employees; and (f) all part-time 
employees.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: June 5, 2015
Albany, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
SEIU LOCAL 200UNITED,
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. C-6308
CITY OF ALBANY,
Employer.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected;
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act;
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that SEIU Local 200United has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances.
Included: All employees in the title of School Crossing Officer.
Excluded: All other employees.
Certification - C-6308 - 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with SEIU Local 200United. The duty to negotiate collectively
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party.
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession.
DATED: June 5, 2015
Albany, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
EAST MEADOW TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO,
Charging Party,
CASE NOS. U-27398, 
U-27735, U-27741 & U-27783
- and -
EAST MEADOW UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT,
Respondent.
BARBARA JACCOMA, for Charging Party
LITTLER MENDELSON, P. C. (CRAIG R. BENSON, GEORGE B. 
PAUTA and ADAM MALIK of counsel), for Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
These consolidated cases come to us on exceptions filed by the East Meadow 
Union Free School District (District), and contemporaneously filed exceptions by the 
East Meadow Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO (Association) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) resolving four consolidated improper 
practice charges.1 In his decision, the ALJ dismissed the Association’s claims that 
disciplinary charges against the Association’s building president predicated on alleged 
misconduct in the context of informational picketing, and that his subsequent transfer
1 43 PERB ^ 4530 (2010). Following issuance of the ALJ’s decision, multiple 
extensions were granted by the Board for the filing of exceptions and responses, as well 
as supplemental briefing, due to, inter alia, the pendency of related litigation, leading to 
delays in issuance of this decision.
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constituted retaliation for protected activity, in Case Nos. U-27735 and U-27741 
respectively. The ALJ further found that disciplinary charges against other tenured 
teachers arising out of discrete instances of informational picketing (Case No. U-27783) 
and of leafleting and refusing an order to cease distributing leafleting (Case No. 
U-27398) were brought in retaliation for protected activity.
EXCEPTIONS
The District excepts to the ALJ’s finding that it violated § 209-a.1(a) of the Public 
Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it commenced Education Law § 3020-a 
disciplinary charges against Association unit members Ryan Malone (Case No. 27398), 
and in also bringing charges against Frank Fortney (Fortney) and Neil Golden (Golden) 
for engaging in protected activities under the Act (Case No. 27783). The Association 
excepted to the ALJ’s dismissal of its claims that the District violated § 209-a.1(a) of the 
Act by initiating Education Law (EL) § 3020-a disciplinary charges against Association 
unit member Richard Santer (Case No. U-27735), and when it involuntarily transferred 
Santer (Case No. U-27741).
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During the processing of the charges, the ALJ granted the District’s motion to 
dismiss, in part, Case No. U-27735 to the extent it alleged that the District violated § 
209-a. 1(a) of the Act when it initiated EL § 3020-a disciplinary charges against 
Association unit members Roberta Herman, Barbara Lucia and Gina Trupiano.2 
Thereafter, the four charges were consolidated for hearing, and the ALJ conducted six 
days of hearing.
2 ALJ Exhibits 20 and 23.
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After the record was closed, the District moved to have the record in Case Nos. 
U-27735 and U-27741 reopened to admit into evidence arbitration awards by Hearing 
Officers appointed to hear disciplinary charges issued against Trupiano and Santer 
pursuant to EL § 3020-a.3 In the awards, Trupiano and Santer were found guilty of 
misconduct for participating in an Association-initiated concerted action on March 2, 
2007 involving Association members parking their personal vehicles on a public street in 
front of a District middle school, creating a health and safety risk for students being 
dropped off for school. Trupiano received a counseling memorandum, while Santer was 
ordered to pay a fine. Over the Association’s objections, the ALJ granted the District’s 
motion to reopen the record, and granted deference to the arbitral findings.4
Following issuance of the ALJ’s decision, the District filed a motion seeking the 
reopening of the record in Case No. U-27398 to admit an EL § 3020-a arbitration award 
concerning disciplinary charges issued against Malone and seeking reconsideration of 
the ALJ’s decision concerning Malone based upon the arbitration award.5 Both motions 
were denied by the ALJ.6
Trupiano, Malone and Santer commenced separate special proceedings 
pursuant to EL § 3020-a (5) and Civil Procedure Law and Rules (CPLR) § 7511 seeking 
to vacate the respective disciplinary arbitration awards and penalties, on grounds 3456
3 East Meadown Union Free Sch Dist v Trupiano, SED #7737 (2009), Respondent 
Exhibit 26; East Meadown Union Free Sch Dist v Santer, SED #7735 (2010), 
Respondent Exhibit 27.
4 Supra note 1, at 4648-49.
5 ALJ Exhibits 38, 40.
6 ALJ Exhibit 43.
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including that the imposition of discipline under the circumstances violated the teachers’ 
rights to free speech under the State and Federal Constitutions.7 In Santer v Bd of 
Education of East Meadow Union Free School District, the Court of Appeals balanced 
the parties’ interests as implicated by the March 2, 2007 informational picketing.8 After 
weighing the employees’ speech rights against the employer’s interest in protecting 
students and maintaining orderly administration, the Court found that disciplining the 
participants did not violate their constitutional right to free speech. The majority found 
that the teachers’ "interest in engaging in constitutionally protected speech in the 
particular manner that was employed that day were outweighed by the District’s 
interests in safeguarding students and maintaining effective operations at Woodland 
[Middle School].”9 Two judges dissented, finding that the speech should have been 
deemed protected.
FACTS
Prior to the expiration of the September 1, 1999-August 31,2004 collectively 
negotiated agreement between the District and the Association, the parties commenced 
negotiations for a successor agreement. Following four negotiating sessions, the 789
7 See Trupiano v Bd of Educ of East Meadow Union Free Sch Dist, 2010 WL 3384696, 
(Sup Ct Nassau Co Aug 10, 2010), affd as modified, 89 AD3d 1030 (2d Dept 2011), lv 
denied, 18 NY3d 810 (2012); Malone v Bd of Educ of the East Meadow Union Free Sch 
Dist, 2010 WL 9049338 (Sup Ct Nassau Co December 1,2010 2010), affd, 93 AD3d 
849 (2d Dept 2012) lv denied, 19 N.Y.3d 807 (2012); Santer v Bd of Educ of East 
Meadow Union Free Sch Dist, Index No. 1997/2010 (Sup Ct Nassau Co October 7, 
2010), revd, 101 AD3d 1026, 45 PERB ^ 7511 (2d Dept 2012), revd, 23 NY3d 251,
47 PERB ^ 7502 (2014).
8 23 NY3d 251,47 PERB ^ 7502 (2014). Judge Smith concurred, contending that the 
speech in question did not fall within the ambit of the First Amendment.
9 Id, at 269.
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District filed a declaration of impasse. During the conciliation process, the parties 
participated in multiple mediation sessions, fact-finding and superconciliation resulting in 
a memorandum of agreement dated July 24, 2007.
Case Nos. U-27735 & 27741 (Santer)
These cases involve the March 2, 2007 informational picketing in front of 
Woodland Middle School. The picketing on that day took place in inclement weather, 
and involved the participants, prior to the start of the workday, displaying signs while 
sitting in their parked cars, on both sides of the street, in spaces legally available at that 
time to members of the general public.10 The cars were parked in such a manner as to 
not block the curb cuts, and to leave a gap to allow access to a walkway leading to the 
lobby of the school.
Principal James Lethbridge testified that on a normal school day, students are 
dropped off on the north side of the street, and wait to cross when the traffic is clear, 
either at the curb or between any parked cars. Lethbridge further testified that even on 
normal days, when cars are proceeding in both directions, the student drop-off area 
constituted a health and safety hazard, but that he had not taken action regarding the 
problem in the approximately 20 months he had been principal.
As a result of participating in the March 2, 2007 informational picketing, Richard 
Santer, a tenured science teacher and Association building president, was charged with 
misconduct under EL § 3020-a, in that he "intentionally created a health and safety 
hazard by purposely situating his vehicle along [the street] causing children to be
10 Picketing took place on Fridays from 7:30 a.m. to approximately 7:50 a.m.; signs on 
the section of the street the teachers parked on March 2, 2007 delineate it as a "no 
stopping” zone from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on school days.
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dropped off in the middle of the street.”11 Three other teachers, Roberta Herman, 
Barbara Lucia, and Gina Trupiano, were similarly charged.
On May 30, 2007, Santer won reelection as building president, and informed 
Lethbridge that same day. Santer subsequently received a letter dated June 7, 2007, 
informing him that he was being involuntarily transferred to Bowling Green Elementary 
School. Santer spoke to Lethbridge, who was non-committal about retaining him at the 
middle school. Santer then met with the superintendent for human resources, Louis 
DeAngelo. DeAngelo testified that he did not know that Santer had been re-elected as 
building president by the time of the transfer. DeAngelo advised him that the District 
wanted to start a science research program at the elementary school and also 
mentioned two specific science programs: the Jason project, a research-based science 
program geared toward elementary school, and the Pablica School based model.12 
DeAngelo testified that it is rare to find a teacher who is certified to teach at the fifth 
grade level and has a strong science background.13
Santer also spoke with Maria Ciaremetaro, the principal at Bowling Green 
School, who advised him that they needed help in the science department.
Ciaremetaro testified that she spoke with DeAngelo concerning the need to replace a 
retiring fifth grade teacher and her preference for someone with a strong background in 
science.14 She told Santer that someone was needed to assume a leadership role in
11 Charging Party Exhibit 25; Respondent Exhibit 6.
12 Transcript at pp. 190-94.
13 Transcript at pp. 680-82.
14 Transcript at pp. 817-818.
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the reemerging Jason Project.15 Ciaremetaro testified that Santer has been a very 
positive addition, and has in fact enhanced the science program at the school.16 The 
Jason Project was not implemented in 2007-2008, but Santer (along with a third grade 
teacher) instituted a similar program called Immersion Presents.17 By the time of the 
hearing before the ALJ, Santer was the leader of the Jason Project at Bowling Green.18 
Ciaremetaro testified that he is looked to as a resource in the department by other 
teachers.
Case No. U-27783 (Fortney and Golden)
On March 26, 2007, Lethbridge placed traffic cones to create a driving lane for 
parents to use in dropping off students, putting up a sign reading "Student Drop Off 
Area.” On March 26 and March 30, despite the presence of the cones, cars were 
parked alongside the curb. On March 30, only two cars were parked in that lane, 
belonging to teachers Frank Fortney (Association building president at Bowling Green 
for 2006-2007) and Neil Golden, who had been a teacher at McVey Elementary School, 
where he had been building president for 20 to 25 years, and who retired in 2007. As a 
result, any parent who parked behind them could not proceed alongside the curb. 
Golden testified that he refused an instruction to move delivered by a man he thought 
was a custodian. In refusing to move, Golden stated that he was parked legally.
Golden reiterated this position when Lethbridge approached and asked him to move the
15 Transcript at pp. 800-801.
16 Transcript at pp. 812-16.
17 Transcript at pp. 806-807.
18 Transcript at pp. 812-813.
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car. When Golden refused, Lethbridge stated that the car’s location endangered 
students. Fortney was likewise asked to move and refused. Both were later charged 
with misconduct and insubordination pursuant to EL § 3020-a.
Case No. U-27398 (Malone)
Tenured teacher and Association building president Ryan Malone was disciplined 
for handing out leaflets to parents concerning the ongoing labor dispute. Malone’s 
actions took place on his own time, and on public property -  on the exit road from the 
school property, at the corner of the street upon which the East Meadow High School is 
situated. Malone would make eye contact with the driver, and, if the driver pulled over 
and lowered the window, give the driver a leaflet. Depending on whether the driver was 
exiting left or right, Malone took one or two steps to hand the leaflet to the driver, or 
walked halfway across the exit road. Principal Mark Scher approached Malone shortly 
before the start of the workday and ordered him to stop leafleting. Malone replied that 
he was not doing anything wrong, and, noticing the time, reported to work, subsequently 
telling Scher that he was "anti-teacher and anti-union.”19 Scher replied that the 
leafleting, in his opinion, created a safety hazard for students and staff, and it was his 
opinion that mattered.
Scher subsequently gave Malone a memorandum dated October 19, 2006 
summarizing the incident and instructed him to acknowledge that his behavior was 
insubordinate. The memorandum stated that not providing such an acknowledgement 
"would cause this matter to be referred further.”20 On October 25, 2006, Scher provided
19 Transcript at p. 101.
20 Transcript at p. 104.
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a second memorandum stating that no written response had been received from 
Malone to Scher’s October 19 memorandum, and that if none were received by the next 
day, the matter would be referred to the District. Malone testified that he provided such 
a response but did not retain a copy. Scher denied that he or anybody in his office had 
received a response from Malone. Subsequently, Malone was charged pursuant to EL 
§ 3020-a with misconduct for obstructing vehicles from exiting the high school and 
creating a hazardous situation, and with insubordination for refusing to comply with 
Scher’s directive to desist.
Further Proceedings and Related Litigation 
The Hearing Officer rendered a decision in the EL § 3020-a proceedings against 
Malone on March 24, 2010, finding Malone culpable of the charges and fining him one 
day’s pay. In so holding, the Hearing Officer found that "as autos approached [Malone] 
raised his hand which contained leaflets in an attempt to make eye contact. If contact 
[was] made he walked off the sidewalk into the road and handed the driver a leaflet.”21 
The Hearing officer specifically found that "Malone had to obstruct traffic, even for a 
brief moment or two, each time he handed out a leaflet,” and that "the egress onto 
Carman Avenue was somewhat slower than on regular school days.”22 The Hearing 
Officer also found "a nexus between what [Malone] did and the operation of the school,” 
implicating the District’s "right to ensure the safety of parents and others who are 
dropping students off at school,” and its concomitant "obligation to see that traffic
21 ALJ Exhibit 40, Attachment "A,” Exhibit at p. 10.
22 Id. at 11-12.
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progresses smoothly and without interference as vehicles leave the school property.”23 
That decision was mailed by the State Education Department to the District and 
its counsel on March 30, 2010, and bears a "received” stamp from counsel’s office 
reflecting receipt on April 8, 2010. On April 20, 2010, counsel for the District sent via 
facsimile and first-class mail a letter motion to re-open the record and to admit into 
evidence the March 24, 2010 EL § 3020-a decision.24 The ALJ’s decision, dated April 
20, 2010, was received by counsel for the District on April 26, 2010. The District 
submitted a letter motion reiterating its request that the ALJ reopen the record and 
further requesting him to reconsider his decision in light of the March 24, 2010 EL § 
3020-a decision. The Association opposed the motion. On June 10, 2010, the ALJ 
denied the motion to reopen and reconsider his decision, other than allowing the 
correspondence and the March 24, 2010 EL § 3020-a decision to be received into the 
record for identification only.25 The EL § 3020-a award was confirmed by the Supreme 
Court, Nassau County, on December 1,2010, in a decision subsequently affirmed by 
the Appellate Division, Second Department.26
The March 2, 2007 informational picketing was the subject of parallel 
proceedings that resulted in the decision of the Court of Appeals. In statutory arbitration
23 Id. at 12.
24 The District acknowledges that, prior to the issuance of the ALJ’s decision, two similar 
motions were made by it and granted by the ALJ in consolidated cases. As was the 
case with its two successful motions, the letter motion did not annex a copy of the EL § 
3020-a decision at issue, but offered to provide one if required to by the ALj .
25 ALJ Exhibit 43.
26 Malone v Bd of Educ of the East Meadow Union Free Sch Dist, supra note 7.
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under the EL, the respective Hearing Officers found that Santer and Lucia had 
committed misconduct by creating a health and safety risk by parking their cars in such 
a manner that students had to be dropped off in the middle of the street instead of at 
curbside. They were each fined in the amounts of $500 (Santer) and $1,000 (Lucia). 
Santer and Lucia each challenged the discipline imposed upon them pursuant to Article 
75 of the CPLR. The petitions asserted that the informational picketing was entitled to 
protection under the First Amendment, mandating annulment of the disciplinary 
awards.27
In an order dated October 7, 2010, Supreme Court, Nassau County denied 
Santer’s petition, and upheld the disciplinary sanctions; the Appellate Division, Second 
Department reversed.28
On May 3, 2013, we provided the parties with an opportunity to brief the effect, if 
any, of the Second Department decision in Santer on the issues pending before us. On 
May 20, 2013, counsel for the District informed us that the Court of Appeals had 
completed its jurisdictional inquiry and that it had set forth the briefing schedule for the 
appeal to the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the matter was again placed on hold 
pending issuance of a decision by the Court of Appeals.
On May 6, 2014, the Court of Appeals reversed the Second Department’s
27 See Pickering v Bd of Educ of Township High Sch Dist 205, Will County, III., 391 US 
563 (1968); Melzer v Bd of Educ of City Sch Dist of City of NY, 336 F3d 185, 197 (2d 
Cir 2003).
28 Santer v East Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 101 AD3d 1026, 1028 (2d Dept 2012). 
The Second Department reached the same conclusion as to Lucia. Lucia v Board of 
Educ of East Meadow Union Free Sch Dist, 109 AD3d 545, 547 (2d Dept 2013).
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decision.29 The majority opinion found that the speech of Santer and Lucia related to a 
matter of public concern, and was therefore entitled to First Amendment protection. The 
Court found that the District’s interests were legitimate: "ensuring the safety of its 
students and maintaining orderly operations at Woodland.”30 The Court of Appeals 
further found that the District had adduced sufficient evidence to justify its discipline of 
Santer and Lucia, by "show[ing] that the parking demonstration created dangerous 
traffic conditions in front of the school that could have injured a student and that caused 
actual disruption to the school’s operations.”31 The Court of Appeals relied heavily on 
the State’s "public policy in favor of protecting children,” and the District’s in loco 
parentis role as to students in public schools.32 In justifying its conclusion, the Court 
relied on: (1) Santer’s own testimony describing his opposition to the parking activity on 
safety grounds; (2) Lethbridge’s testimony regarding danger; (3) the Hearing Officer’s 
finding that the teachers had intended to cause a disruption, and (4) the Court’s own 
finding that a disruption had in fact resulted, as evidenced by the lateness of 16 
teachers, with a resultant need to cover their homeroom assignments.33
29 Santer, supra note 8.
30 Id. at 265.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Santer, supra note 8, at 266-268. The Court found that although the parking was 
"entirely legal...weighs in petitioner’s favor, it does not outbalance the evidence of 
disruption.” Id. at 268. It explained that the circumstances, not the abstract legality, 
controlled, and that "the District, as a public employer, may impose restraints on the 
First Amendment activities of its employees even when such restraints would be 
unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.” Id. at n. 11 (quotation and editing 
marks and citation omitted).
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The Board provided the parties with an opportunity to re-brief the effect, if any, on 
the instant cases of the Court of Appeals’ decision in Santer. After two requests for 
extensions, briefs were filed on December 22, 2014.
DISCUSSION
Because of the multiple charges involving the same or similar incidents, as well 
as several parallel litigations relating to these consolidated cases, we address the 
individual claims seriatim.
U-27735 & 27741 (Santer)
The Association, in its supplemental brief, seeks to withdraw its exceptions in U- 
27735, which arise from the same facts as at issue in the Court of Appeals’s decision in 
Santer. Pursuant to § 204.1 (d) of our Rules, that request is granted, and the 
exceptions are withdrawn.
Case No. U-27741 arises out of Santer’s transfer from Woodland Middle School 
to Bowling Green Elementary School, shortly after his re-election as Association 
building president. We find that the Association has not provided a sufficient basis to 
warrant our reversing the ALJ’s credibility determination that the transfer was not 
motivated by retaliation for Santer’s protected activity.
When an improper practice charge alleges unlawfully motivated retaliation in 
violation of §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, the charging party has the burden of 
demonstrating three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: a) that the affected 
individual engaged in protected activity under the Act; b) such activity was known to the 
person or persons taking the employment action; and c) the employment action would
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not have been taken "but for” the protected activity.34
Where a charging party establishes a prima facie case of unlawful motivation 
through circumstantial evidence, the burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent to 
rebut the inference by presenting evidence demonstrating that the employment action or 
conduct was motivated by a legitimate non-discriminatory business reason. If the 
respondent establishes a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, then the burden shifts 
back to the charging party to establish that the articulated non-discriminatory reason is 
pretextual. At all times, however, "the burden of proof rests with the charging party to 
establish the requisite causation under the Act by a preponderance of evidence.”35
Credibility determinations by an ALJ "are generally entitled to great weight unless 
there is objective evidence in the record compelling a conclusion that the credibility 
finding is manifestly incorrect.”36 In the instant case, no objective evidence 
demonstrating that the ALJ’s credibility determinations are manifestly incorrect has been 
adduced, and we therefore decline to reverse them.
The Association, contending that the reasons given by the District’s witnesses 
are pretextual, points to the temporal proximity between Santer’s known protected 3456
34 UFT, Local 2, AFT-CIO (Jenkins), 41 PERB fl 3007(2008), confirmed sub nom 
Jenkins v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 41 PEr B fl 7007 (Sup Ct, New York 
County 2008), affd, 67 AD3d 567, 42 PERB fl 7008 (1st Dept 2009); State of New York 
(State University of New York at Buffalo), 46 PERB fl 3021 (2013); see also Dutchess 
Cmty College, 47 PERB fl 3018, at 3056 (2014).
35 Id.
36 Village of Endicott, 47 PERB fl 3017, at 3051 (2014) (quoting Manhasset Union Free 
Sch Dist, 41 PERB fl 3005, at 3019 (2008)) (quotation marks omitted); County of Tioga, 
44 PERB fl 3016, at 3062 (2011); Mount Morris Cent Sch Dist, 41 PERB fl 3020 (2008); 
see also City of Rochester, 23 PERB fl 3049 (1990); Hempstead Housing Auth, 12 
PERB fl 3054 (1979); Captain’s Endowment Assn, 10 PERB fl 3034 (1977).
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activity, i.e., his re-election, and the adverse employment action:
That anti-union animus was the real motivation can be 
inferred from other uncontroverted evidence: Santer and 
Lethbridge had an acrimonious relationship; Santer was re­
elected to Building President at the end of May 2007; and 
Santer was transferred within the first week of June 2007. 37
While this evidence might, on the record here, support an ALJ’s credibility 
determination finding that retaliation had occurred, it does not constitute the objective 
evidence that the ALJ’s contrary finding was "manifestly incorrect” that is required to 
justify reversal of a contrary finding in such cases.
The ALJ’s finding that the District had established a legitimate business reason 
for the transfer rests partly on undisputed facts and partly on the ALJ’s credibility 
determinations. The undisputed facts relied on by the ALJ include the District’s right to 
transfer teachers, and its obligation to inform a teacher who is to be transferred by June 
10. Santer was one of 18 teachers transferred at this time, and Ciaremetaro requested 
a new science teacher for Bowling Green to fill a vacancy precipitated by a retirement. 
Nor are Santer’s qualifications for the newly vacant position and the difficulty of finding 
teachers certified to teach at the fifth grade level with a strong science background in 
dispute. Against this backdrop, the ALJ found the testimony offered by the District 
concerning its reasons for the transfer to be credible, and to constitute legitimate 
business reasons. This finding is not rendered manifestly incorrect by the fact that 
Santer was not designated a science mentor and the Jason Project was not 
immediately commenced upon his transfer. In fact, in that first year, Santer instituted a 
similar program, and was subsequently instrumental in the revival of the Jason Project.
37 Charging Party’s Brief in Support of Exceptions at 10.
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Between the ALJ’s credibility determinations and the undisputed evidence supporting 
the ALJ’s finding of a legitimate business reason for the transfer, we cannot find those 
determinations to be manifestly incorrect. Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s decision and 
dismiss the exceptions in Case No. U-27741.
U-27783 (Fortney and Golden)
Similarly, the Association contends that Case No. U-27783, involving the 
disciplinary charges proffered against Fortney and Golden, has been rendered moot by 
their retirements and by the withdrawal of charges by the District as to Golden, and the 
lack of any decision as to Fortney.
We have long held that where "the issues raised by [improper practice] charges
are academic, we do not consider that the policies of the Act would be served by our
consideration of [the] charges.”38 In so holding, we explained that:
[W]e decline to follow so much of any prior decisions which 
hold or suggest that traditional mootness concepts may not 
be applied in any of our improper practice proceedings. Our 
decision in this respect is limited to the facts and 
circumstances of this case. We recognize that the 
application of a mootness concept is controlled by the 
particular facts of the case and applied only to the extent 
consistent with the policies of the Act.39
The Association’s request that we treat the matter as moot, in view of our inability 
to fashion any remedy to the benefit of either Golden and Fortney, is not without logic or 
precedent. We have previously granted a school district’s exceptions to our issuance of 
a remedial order based on a finding of discriminatory discipline when the affected
38 City of Peekskill, 26 PERB ^ 3062, at 3109 (1993).
39 Id.
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employee "had ceased to be an employee of the [d]istrict even before the hearing 
officer's decision was issued.”40 In that case, the finding of improper motivation was not 
in question; here, the District’s exceptions challenge that finding, and the District objects 
to this finding’s evading review through a declaration that the matter is moot. We find 
that the charge is moot, but that under these circumstances, the policies of the Act will 
not be served by merely dismissing the exceptions on those grounds, rendering the 
ALJ’s finding unreviewable, albeit neither final nor binding in view of the filing of 
exceptions.41 Rather, in Case No. U-27783, we find that we must, as have the courts in 
similar circumstances, "vacate the underlying order in order to prevent it from spawning 
any legal consequences or precedent.” 42 Accordingly, we find the charge to be moot, 
and vacate the ALJ’s order with respect to the charge.
U-27398 (Malone)
With respect to Case No. U-27398, we reverse the ALJ’s decision. As a 
threshold matter, we find the District’s claim that the Court of Appeals’ decision in 
Santer establishes error as a matter of law on the part of the ALJ to be unpersuasive. 
The District’s contention both misstates the Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Santer and 
the applicability of that decision to the facts here.
It is well established that state law "can offer broader protections for its citizens 
than is afforded by the Federal Constitution, which sets the floor rather than 4012
40 See, e.g., Bd of Educ of Limestone Union Free Sch Dist, 12 PERB ^ 3006 (1979).
41 Rules § 213.6 (b).
42 Civ Serv Tech Guild v City of New York, 58 AD3d 581 (1st Dept 2009) (quoting Hearst 
Corp v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 718 (1980) (editing marks omitted)).
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the ceiling for an individual’s rights.”43 Consonant with this principle, we have long held
that the scope of expressive activity protected under the Act is broader than that
protected under the First Amendment. Thus, in Sachem Central School District Board
of Education, we rejected the employer’s claim that because the First Amendment did
not proscribe the employer’s prohibiting a non-certified union’s access to employer-
provided teacher mailboxes, the limitation did not violate the Act.44 As we explained:
The right to organize granted to public employees by 
§ 202 of the Taylor Law exceeds those rights that are 
protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution 
so long as this statutory right or its exercise does not 
infringe upon constitutional guarantees.45
Thus, even were the decision of the Court of Appeals dispositive as to Malone’s 
rights under the First Amendment, it would not of its own weight resolve the improper 
practice charge under the Act.
Moreover, the District’s argument misstates the Court’s holding in Santer. In 
arguing that the ALJ erred in finding Malone’s activity protected under the Act, the 
District contends that, under the Court’s analysis of the First Amendment claim before it,
43 People v Sanad, 2015 WL 479770 (Crim Ct Bronx Co Jan 28, 2015) (citing cases); 
see Davenport v Wash Educ Assn, 551 US 177, 185 (2007) (upholding state statutory 
regulation on ground that "the constitutional floor for unions' collection and spending of 
agency fees is not also a constitutional ceiling for state-imposed restriction”).
44 11 PERB fl 3027 (1978).
45 Id. at 3048. That First Amendment rights and rights under the Act are not 
coterminous is further exemplified by State of New York (State University of New York 
at Stony Brook), 33 PERB fl 3045, at 3122-3123, n. 1 (2000); Arlington Cent Sch Dist, 
25 PERB fl 3001, at 3007, n. 9 (1992); and Eastchester Cent Sch Dist, 29 PERB fl 3041 
(1996).
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"the fact that Malone’s activity was lawful is immaterial.”46 This is, however, inaccurate. 
In Santer, the Court expressly found "that petitioners’ parking was entirely legal, but 
while that weighs in petitioners’ favor, it does not outweigh the evidence of disruption” 
caused by that parking-picketing activity, which, the Court found, hindered the dropping 
off of children on a rainy morning.47 The Court found that the evidence established 
both "actual disruption” of school operations, and "a potential risk to student safety” that 
"outweighed the First Amendment value of petitioners’ speech about collective 
bargaining.”48 This context-specific balancing of interests based upon evidentiary facts 
as to the parking-picketing does not predetermine the outcome of the First Amendment 
balancing test to the different factual context presented by Malone’s solitary leafleting, 
let alone the outcome under the Act.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Malone’s leafleting was known to the 
employer; it, and his refusal to desist when ordered to do so, were the basis of the 
charges under EL § 3020-a.49 Nor did Malone deny being ordered to desist. Rather, 
the ALJ found that Malone’s activity was protected, and that the insubordination charge 
was part and parcel of improperly motivated disciplinary action for which no legitimate 
non-discriminatory reason was adduced. We need not and do not find that the ALJ 
erred on the record before him. In so finding, however, we nonetheless cannot agree
46 District’s Supplemental Brief at 7-8, citing Santer, 23 NY3d at 268; see also id. at 5 
("the fact that the parking activity [of Santer] was lawful is of no consequence”; citing 
Santer, id.).
47 Santer, 23 NY3d at 268.
48 Id. at 267.
49 Respondent’s Exhibit 5.
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with his conclusion.
In the highly unusual procedural circumstances in which this case comes to us, in 
which notification to the ALJ of the Hearing Officer’s findings under EL § 3020-a and an 
ALJ’s decision quite literally crossed in the mail, the often-invoked risk of inconsistent 
adjudication in fact eventuated. The Hearing Officer’s decision under § 3020-a has long 
been final. By contrast, under § 213.6 (b) of our Rules, the timely filing of exceptions or 
cross-exceptions deprives an ALJ’s decision of finality.50 Thus, we are confronted with 
the question of whether we should defer to an arbitral finding that has not only been the 
status quo between the parties for nearly five years, governing their now-settled 
expectations, but has been confirmed not once, but twice, by the courts. These factors 
militate in favor of deferral to the Hearing Officer’s factual findings.
We have repeatedly stated that:
in order for us in an improper practice proceeding to defer to 
an arbitration award it must be satisfied that the issues 
raised by the improper practice charge were fully litigated in 
the arbitration proceeding, that arbitral proceedings were not 
tainted by unfairness or serious procedural irregularities[,] 
and that the determination of the arbitrator was not clearly 
repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act.51
Neither unfairness nor procedural irregularity has been shown. While the
50 See, e.g., UFT (Thomas) 15 PERB fl 3030, at 3049 (1982);Allen v NYS Pub Empl 
Relations Bd, 33 PERB fl 7001, at 7003 (Sup Ct, Broome Co 2000). EL §3020-a(5)(b), 
by means of comparison, expressly provides that "[i]n no case shall the filing or the 
pendency of an appeal delay the implementation of the decision of the hearing officer.”
51 Matter of New York City Tr Auth (Bordansky ), 4 PERB fl 3031, at 3670(1971); State 
of New York (Ben Aaman), 11 PERB fl 3084 (1978) (citing Bordansky)); see also, City 
of Canandaguia, 47 PEr B fl 3025, at 3072 (2014); State of New York (Dept of Mental 
Hygiene), 11 PERB fl 3084 (1978); Matter of Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist v NYS 
Pub Empl Relations Bd, 21 NY3d 255, 46 PERB fl 7008 (2012) (approving our 
application of Bordansky factors to decline to defer to arbitrator’s findings).
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ultimate issues involved in the arbitration proceedings are different from those at issue 
here, the transaction at issue in both proceedings is the same, and the questions of fact 
are likewise identical. Moreover, deferring to the Hearing Officer’s factual findings with 
respect to Malone’s behavior and its effect on traffic is not repugnant to the Act. Indeed, 
such deference is consistent with the ALJ’s prior rulings in the consolidated cases, in 
which he admitted and deferred to the factual findings of the Hearing Officers in awards 
brought to his attention prior to the issuance of his decision. Accordingly, we adopt the 
Hearing Officer’s finding that Malone obstructed traffic leaving the school in a manner 
implicating the school’s operations.
This factual finding does not, of course, end our inquiry. We must determine 
whether the presumptively protected activity of leafleting in support of concerted union 
activity lost its protected status here, as the District alleges. On the facts before us, we 
find that it does. It is well settled that "otherwise protected activity may be found to be 
unprotected under the Act when, under the totality of the circumstances, the conduct is 
found to be impulsive, overzealous, confrontational, or disruptive.”52
Here, as Malone admitted and the Hearing Officer found, Malone sought to
distract drivers on their way out of the school grounds, and his behavior had the effect
of obstructing traffic, thus interfering with the efficient drop off of students at the
beginning of the school day. Notably, this effect was not adventitious but was inherent
in the method Malone chose to disseminate his message—for Malone to distribute a
52 State of New York (Division of Parole), 41 PERB fl 3033, at 3146 (2008) (citing State 
of New York (ben Aaman, supra note 50); Kings Park Cent Sch Dist, 24 PERB fl 3026 
(1991); Erie County Water Auth, 24 PERB fl 3046 (1991); Greenburgh No. 11 Union 
Free Sch Dist, 30 PERB fl 3052 (1997), confd as modified sub nom,Greenburgh No. 11 
Union Free Sch Dist v Kinsella, 253 AD2d 46, 32 PERB fl 7004 (3d Dept 1999) lv 
denied, 93 NY2d 810, 32 PERB fl 7014 (1999).
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leaflet, the driver would have to stop, with the result that drivers of following cars would 
have to stop as well. On these factual findings, particularly that of the EL § 3020-a 
Hearing Officer that actual obstruction of traffic resulted from Malone’s behavior, we find 
that his leafleting was done in such a manner as to lose the protection of the Act.
Conclusion
Accordingly, we approve, pursuant to Rule 204(1) (d) of our Rules, the
withdrawal of the exceptions in Case No. U-27735. We affirm the ALJ’s decision in
Case No. U-27741 and the charge is dismissed. Further, we find Case No. U-27783
moot, and, for the reasons stated above, vacate the decision as to that case. Finally,
for the reasons stated above, we defer to the Hearing Officer’s factual findings, and
reverse the ALJ’s decision in Case No. U-27398, and dismiss the charge in that matter.
DATED: June 5, 2015
Albany, New York
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Utica City School District 
(District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granting an improper 
practice charge filed by the Service Employees International Union, Local 200United 
(SEIU).1 The ALJ found that the District violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (d) of the Public 
Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) by refusing to provide to SEIU the updated 
names, addresses and telephone numbers of the members of the bargaining unit 
employed by the District. The ALJ ordered the District to provide information requested 
by SEIU for purposes of contract administration.
EXCEPTIONS
The District excepts to the ALJ’s decision on several bases. First, the District 
contends that the ALJ’s decision is "tainted by the clear bias of the” ALJ "as evidenced 
by her apparent predetermination” of the issue, an allegation based on her referring the
1 47 PERB 4572 (2014).
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parties to the Board’s case law after a conference.2 The District also asserts that SEIU 
failed to explain the need for and relevance of the information to the employer in its 
request, thereby negating the obligation of the employer to respond to the request. The 
District asserts that the ALJ did not balance the interests of the parties appropriately, 
and that the burden to the employer of providing the information is substantial and real. 
The District further claims that the ALJ improperly considered allegations in the 
Amended Charge relating to a separate improper practice charge which was deemed 
abandoned. Finally, the District argues that the statutory right to privacy of the 
individual employees prohibits the District from disclosing the requested addresses and 
telephone numbers to SEIU.
FACTS
The parties stipulated as to the following facts:
The District and SEIU are parties to a collectively negotiated agreement, the 
most current of which runs from July 1,2008 through June 30, 2012. This agreement 
provides for and incorporates a form entitled "Application for Membership” which is 
completed by all new unit members and conveyed by the District to SEIU. Among other 
things, this form asks that the employee’s home address and telephone number be 
provided.
In the Spring of 2011, SEIU executive vice president Liz Golembeski made at 
least one request to the District for an updated seniority list, including addresses and 
telephone numbers.
In February 2011, Richard Ambruso, then the District’s Human Resources 
Director, wrote Golemeski that an updated seniority list would be provided, but that
2 Exceptions ^ 1(a).
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SEIU’s request for social security numbers of bargaining unit members was under 
review.
On April 18, 2011, Golembeski contacted Andrew Lalonde, a BOCES labor 
relations specialist assigned to work with the District, by e-mail, again requesting an 
updated seniority list, including addresses, telephone numbers and dates of hire. 
Golembeski acknowledged receipt of a list of unit members from the District that did not 
include addresses or telephone numbers. Golembeski stated that the omitted 
information was necessary for SEIU to administer the collective bargaining agreement.
On May 20, 2011, the instant improper practice charge was filed.
The amended charge adds that:
The requested information is needed because the Union’s 
ability to communicate with its members is central to its 
representational responsibilities. A specific example of this 
is that the Union sends informational newsletters to the 
membership. It is necessary to ensure that the addresses 
are accurate and current. Also, Union representatives have 
needed to contact members directly by telephone, such as 
when the Union was barred by the District from having a 
membership meeting on District premises. The Union had 
very little notice, and a change of venue was planned. Union 
representatives attempted to contact members by telephone 
to alert them of the change, but realized that many of the 
numbers were no longer accurate.
The need for the requested information has been heightened 
by the District’s interference with typical communication 
methods. The Union has an Improper Practice charge U- 
30821.3 One of the issues in this case is the District’s 
restriction of access to Union representatives.
Consequently, the Union must have its members’ addresses 
and phone numbers so that they may be informed about the 
Union’s representational activities.4
3 The charge in Case No. U-30821 was deemed withdrawn and administratively closed 
on June 28, 2012 when there was no response from SEIU to a status update request.
4 Although not relevant to the exceptions, the parties stipulated that SEIU’s local 
leadership objected to SEIU’s gathering this information.
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On September 19, 2011, the ALJ sent a letter to the representatives of the 
parties memorializing their conference held that day. In the letter, the ALJ stated, in 
pertinent part:
With respect to the merits of the charge, I strongly suggest that both 
of you review County of Yates, 27 PERB 3080 and Town of 
Greenburgh, 20 PeRb 4606 before proceeding with the charge. If, 
after reviewing the cases, a second conference would be helpful, 
please contact me to schedule.
If the charge is to proceed, I see no reason why a hearing will be 
required as there do not appear to be any relevant facts in dispute.
DISCUSSION
We begin with the District’s claim of bias, predicated on the ALJ’s September 19, 
2011 letter, referring the parties to our decision in County of Yates5 and an ALJ decision 
in Town of Greenburgh.6 The District has not adduced any evidence of personal 
animosity or bias on the part of the ALJ against the District. Nor does the District 
dispute the relevance of the cases cited by the ALJ in her letter, though it seeks to 
distinguish them, and it did not except to the decision to decide the case without a 
hearing. Indeed, the District "does not contest the general relevancy of having the 
names and addresses of its members to the conduct of the Union’s business,” but 
rather "does contest the reasonableness of the Union’s instant request for that 
information again.” 7 Accordingly, we find that here, as was the case in Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York (Grassel), "[t]he pre­
hearing efforts by the ALJ to clarify the charge, and to discuss other preliminary matters 
with the parties before going on the record, are consistent with [her] quasi-judicial 567
5 27 PERB 3080 (1994).
6 20 PERB 4606 (1987).
7 Brief in Support of Exceptions at pp. 4-5.
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responsibilities and do not constitute a basis for recusal,” or, here, a finding of bias 
warranting reversal.8 We therefore deny the District’s exception to the ALJ’s decision 
predicated on its claim that the ALJ’s September 19, 2011 letter constitutes evidence of 
bias. Similarly, nothing in the record or the ALJ’s decision suggests any reliance on 
SEIU’s allegations in the Amended Charge overlapping the prior abandoned charge, nor 
any reason why such facts could not properly be considered if relevant.
We have held that "[t]he general right to receive requested documents and 
information is subject to three primary limitations: reasonableness, which includes the 
burden on the responding party; relevancy; and necessity.”9
We are unpersuaded by the District’s argument that SEIU’s failure to specify the 
reason for the request absolved it of its duty to respond. We have long rejected such an 
"unduly narrow” reading of our decisions.10 To the contrary, we have held that such 
failure to articulate the need for the information required is not fatal when "a finding 
of need and/or relevance can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding 
a request for information.”11 We agree with the ALJ that such is the case here.
The ALJ relied upon another ALJ decision, Town of Greenburgh, which drew 
upon as persuasive a decision of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for the 8910
8 41 PERB fl 3031, 3136 (2008); see also United Fedn of Teachers (Gray), 47 PERB fl 
3011 (2014).
9 Hampton Bays Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB fl 3008, 3051 (2008), confd sub nom 
Hampton Bays Union Free Sch Dist v Pub Empl Relations Bd, 62 AD3d 1066 (3d Dept), 
lv denied, 13 NY3d 711 (2009); Board of Ed, City Sch Dist of the City of Albany, 6 
PERB fl 3012 (1973); see also State of New York (OMRDD), 38 PERB fl 3036 
(2005), confirmed sub nom CSEA v. New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 14 Misc3d 199, 
39 PERB fl 7009 (2006), affd, 46 AD3d 1037, 40 PERB fl 7009 (3d Dept 2007).
10 Salmon River Cent Sch Dist, 21 PERB fl 3006, at 3009 (1988).
11 Id.
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proposition that “[njames and addresses of unit employees should be presumed 
relevant to the union’s role as bargaining representative.”12 The NLRB’s formulation 
was even more to the point here; it stated that "[a] union has a statutory right to receive 
unit members' names and addresses,” explaining that "[t]his information is 
presumptively relevant to the union's role as bargaining agent and no showing of 
particularized need is necessary.”13 Although we have not had occasion to expressly 
comment on that precept, it has been relied upon by ALJs since, and the NLRB still 
applies that presumption.14 We find this rationale persuasive, and we adopt it. 
Moreover, we find the same rationale is equally applicable to members’ telephone 
numbers.
The District claims that the ALJ erred in rejecting its arguments that providing the 
requested information would be burdensome upon the District and that the District met 
its contractual obligation to provide information when it provided the membership 
application forms. To the extent that the District contends that satisfying the contractual 
provision extinguishes the statutory duty, we have held to the contrary. As we 
explained in Hampton Bays Union Free School District, "[a]n agreement that contains 
negotiated terms and conditions that reiterate, expand, modify or touch upon statutory 
rights or procedures, does not eliminate the obligation under the Act to provide
12 20 PERB 4606, 4748 (1987), citing Bozzutto’s, Inc., 275 NLRB 375, 119 LRRM 
1111 (1985).
13 Bozzutto’s, Inc., supra note 10 (quoting Georgetown Holiday Inn, 235 NLRB 485, 486 
(1978) (quotation marks and editing marks omitted)).
14 See, e.g., In re Xcel Energy, Inc., 2002 WL 31662291 (NLRB Div of Judges) 
(November 15, 2002).
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requested information and documents bearing on those negotiated terms.” 15
Nor are we persuaded by the District’s claim that producing the requested 
information is unduly burdensome under the circumstances. SEIU has argued, and the 
District does not dispute, that the addresses and telephone numbers of the unit 
members change over time, and that they are in the possession, custody and control of 
the District. The District did not proffer any evidence or assertions before the ALJ 
specifying what steps would be necessary to produce the information, nor has it 
provided an estimate of the time and resources necessary to take those steps.16 
Rather, it has simply contended that the District has provided the information at an 
earlier time, and that it should not be required to update SEIU’s files. On this basis, it 
has not demonstrated that the request to provide the information would impose an 
undue burden upon it.
Finally, the District’s argument that the privacy interests of the unit members 
justifies the refusal to provide the information to SEIU is unavailing. As we explained in 
County of Yates:
A bargaining agent is simply not similarly situated to the 
general public when it demands employment information 
from an employer about employees it is obligated to 
represent. New York's FOIL is concerned basically with the
15 Supra note 9, at 3051.
16 In its Brief in Support of its Exceptions, the District has alleged that it would have to 
consult the personnel records of the individual employees to provide this information.
Id. at 5. However, no such allegation can be found within the District’s Answer, its brief 
before the ALJ, nor the parties’ stipulation of facts. Section 213.2 of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules) "limits our review of the ALJ's determination to the record before him 
or her.” Civ Serv Empl Assn (Bienko), 47 PERB fl 3027, 3082 (2014), citing Civ Serv 
Empl Assn (Paganini), 36 PERB fl 3006, at 3019 (2003), citing Margolin v Newman, 130 
AD2d 312, 20 PERB fl 7018 (3d Dept 1987), affd other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 
PERB fl 7017 (1988); see also Town of Blooming Grove, 47 PERB fl 3010 (2014); 
Rochester Teachers Assn (Hirsch), 46 PERB fl 3035, at 3078 (2013). Accordingly, we 
do not consider these newly raised factual contentions.
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public's right to know about the operations of government as 
government. A public employee's social security number is 
largely irrelevant to the performance of the employee's 
duties. It is for that reason that disclosure of such information 
is deemed an unwarranted invasion of privacy and exempt 
as such from compulsory disclosure under FOIL. A 
bargaining agent demanding employment information of a 
government, however, is not seeking information about 
government as government, but government as employer. It 
is entitled to demand and receive relevant information from 
an employer under the Act because the information is 
needed to enable it to exercise its rights and carry out the 
responsibilities imposed upon it under the Act.17
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the District’s exceptions are denied 
and the ALJ’s decision is affirmed.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
granted and that the ALJ’s finding that the District is in violation of §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (d) 
of the Act for failing to provide SEIU with the names, addresses and telephone numbers 
of the members of its bargaining unit is hereby affirmed; and
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District forthwith provide SEIU with the
names, addresses and telephone numbers of the members of the bargaining unit it
represents, and sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations
used to post communications for bargaining unit employees.
DATED: June 5, 2015
Albany, New York
17 27 PERB H 3080, at 3184 (1994).
Dated
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
we hereby notify all employees of the Utica City School District in the 
unit represented by Service Employees International Union, Local 
200United that the District will:
1. Provide to Service Employees International Union, Local 200United the 
names, addresses and telephone numbers of the members of the 
bargaining unit of District employees represented by Service 
Employees International Union, Local 200United.
B y ......................................................
on behalf of the Utica City School District
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
LAWRENCE TEACHERS’ ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, 
NEA, AFL-CIO,
-and-
Charging Party,
CASE NO. U-31703
LAWRENCE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
CLAUDIA SCHACTER-DECHABERT, for Charging Party
MINERVA AND D’AGOSTINO, P.C. (CHRISTOPHER G. KIRBY of counsel),
for Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Lawrence Teachers’ 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO (Association) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in an improper practice proceeding.1 The ALJ 
dismissed the Association’s charge alleging that the Lawrence Union Free School 
District (District) violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when, beginning in 2012, the District unilaterally transferred prekindergarten 
teaching responsibilities to another institution, St. Joseph’s College. Relying on our 
construction of Education Law (EL) § 3602-e in Springs Union Free School District
1 47 PERB H 4556 (2014).
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(Springs),2 the ALJ held that the District had no obligation to bargain over its decision to 
transfer the work to St. Joseph’s College, whether or not the work had been exclusively 
performed by Association unit members.3
EXCEPTIONS
The Association asks us to overrule our holding in Springs, and alleges that the 
ALJ erred in not determining whether the at-issue work was exclusive bargaining unit 
work. In response, the District argues that we should not overrule Springs, and that the 
at-issue work was not exclusive bargaining unit work.
FACTS
The Association does not dispute the factual findings of the ALJ, and we need 
not recite them here. Indeed, the only material facts for purposes of our decision are 
that the District has operated the at-issue prekindergarten program pursuant to EL § 
3602-e since 2006, and that in the beginning of 2012 it unilaterally entered into a 
contract with St. Joseph’s College to have the College operate and staff the 
prekindergarten classes on the District’s behalf.
DISCUSSION
In Springs, we provided an exhaustive analysis of EL § 3602-e and its effect on 
the duty to negotiate under the Taylor Law concerning a school district’s decision to 
enter a contract with other entities to operate and staff a prekindergarten program 
cognizable under that statutory scheme. We shall not restate that analysis here, except
2 46 PERB 3040 (2012).
3 The District’s impact bargaining obligations, if any, are not at issue in this matter.
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as necessary to address the Association’s particular argument.
Among the many elements of EL § 3602-e on which we relied in Springs is that 
EL § 3602-e.5 (d) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the school 
districts shall be authorized to enter any contractual or other arrangements necessary to 
implement the district’s prekindergarten plan.” We held that the Legislature clearly 
intended to override the duty under the Act to negotiate concerning contracts with other 
entities to provide the services and staff necessary to implement the statutory 
prekindergarten plan.
The Association argues that the words "notwithstanding any other provision of 
law” in EL § 3602-e.5 (d) applies to the Education Law only. In support, it cites two 
decisions of the Commissioner of Education holding that public schools may not 
contract with independent contractors to provide instructional services on their behalf.4 
According to the Association, the "notwithstanding” language in EL § 3602-e.5 (d) was 
designed to overcome that restriction so as to permit schools to enter into such 
contracts, but no more. Thus, the Association contends that the "notwithstanding” 
language in EL § 3602-e.5 (d) does not extend to the statutory duty to negotiate under 
the Act concerning a decision to enter into such contracts.
We find the argument unpersuasive. If the Legislature had intended such a
narrow application of the words "notwithstanding any other provision of law,” it could
4 The Association relies on Appeal of McKenna, Ed Dept Rep 54 (2002) and Matter of 
Friedman, 19 Ed Dept Rep 522 (1980), where the Commissioner held that school 
districts could not provide certain instructional services with private contractors. That 
EL § 3602-e may override those decisions, as the Association argues, does not mean 
that the "notwithstanding” language in EL § 3602-e.5 (d) applies to those decisions only.
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have easily stated the language as the Association would have us read it. Indeed, 
where the Legislature intended such a narrow reading of similar "notwithstanding” 
language, it said so. EL § 3602-e.5 (f) states: "Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this section to the contrary, two or more school districts may submit a joint application to 
operate a joint universal prekindergarten program” [emphasis added]. Therefore, the 
Association’s argument does not convince us that we should overrule Springs.
Therefore, we shall adhere to our holding in Springs that EL § 3602-e is a 
comprehensive statutory scheme that authorizes school districts to establish and 
operate state-subsidized prekindergarten programs and permits public schools to "enter 
any contractual or other arrangements necessary to implement the district’s 
prekindergarten plan,” notwithstanding any other provision of law, including the Act. 
Similar to City of Schenectady,5 the duty to negotiate under the Act is inconsistent with, 
and must yield to, the Legislature’s plain and clear intent in EL § 3602-e that school 
districts are permitted to unilaterally contract for necessary services to implement a 
prekindergarten program cognizable under that statutory scheme.5 6
The Association’s reliance on Board of Educ of City School Dist of City of the
5 25 PERB ^ 3022 (1992), annulled in part, confirmed in part, sub nom Schenectady 
Police Benev Assn v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 25 PERB ^ 7009 (Sup Ct 
Albany Co 1992), affd as modified 196 AD2d 171,27 PERB ^ 7001 (3d Dept 1994), affd 
85 NY2d 480, 28 PERB ^ 7005 (1995).
6 See also Vestal Empls Assn, NEA/NY, NEA v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 
93 NY2d 815 (1999), 33 PERB ^ 7005 (1999); Webster Cent Sch Dist v New York State 
Pub Empl Relations Bd, 75 NY2d 619, 23 PERB ^ 7013 (1990).
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New York v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd7 is unavailing. There, the Court of 
Appeals found that a statutory grant of discretion to obtain certain confidential 
information from represented public employees did not overcome the duty to negotiate 
concerning the subject. However, the statutory provision at issue in Board of Educ did 
not contain comparable "notwithstanding any other provision of law” language. 
Accordingly, we balanced the school’s interests in obtaining the information under its 
statutory discretion against the impact that the disclosure obligation had on the 
employees’ negotiable interests under the Act, finding that the latter outweighed the 
former. The Court agreed with our application of that balancing test. No balancing test 
is triggered here in view of the plain and clear legislative intent underlying EL § 3602-e, 
including the express "notwithstanding” language contained therein.
Because the District’s decision to contract with St. Joseph’s College to provide 
instructional services for the District’s EL § 3602-e prekindergarten program is not 
mandatorily negotiable, we find it unnecessary to determine whether the work was 
exclusive bargaining unit work. Exclusivity is a factor in determining whether an 
employer has failed to satisfy its bargaining obligations under the Act.7 8 Here, there are 
no such bargaining obligations.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the ALJ and hereby dismiss the
7 75 NY2d 660, 23 PERB fl 7012 (1990).
8 See, e.g., Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB fl 3005 (2008), confirmed and 
mod in part sub nom Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl 
Relations Bd, 61 AD3d 123, 42 PERB fl 7004 (3d Dept 2009), on remittur, 42 PERB fl 
3016 (2009).
Case No. U-31703 -6-
Association’s improper practice charge.
DATED: June 5, 2015
Albany, New York
